ARGUMENTS

AGAINST A

SPANISH WAR.

[Price One Shilling and Six-Pence.]

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SPANISH WAR.

BRITISH MUSEUM

[Price One Halfpenny and Six Pence.]

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AGAINST A

SPANISH WAR.

It is unknown what miſeries raſhneſs may intail.

BACON.

LONDON:
Printed for E. CABE, in *Ave-Mary-Lane.*

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AGAINST A

SPANISH WAR.

BRITISH MUSEUM

44
9. 149.

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AGAINST A

SPANISH WAR.

THE profeſſed deſign of the writer of theſe pages is, to lay before the candid public, what are his reaſons for apprehending a war between Great-Britain and Spain to be, at this juncture, equally impolitic and unneceſſary.

Some may think it extremely arrogant in any private man, unacquainted with the inmoſt receſſes of government, and the ſecret ſprings of action, to differ in opinion from Mr. ——; but they ſhould not forget, that the great

privelige of Engliſhmen is to be free, to think, to ſpeak, and to write as they pleaſe, if they do not injure the government; and that the liberty of the preſs is equally the prerogative of one ſide, as much as the other; therefore every man is at liberty to publiſh his thoughts, and it is an infringement on liberty, if only ONE ſide is allowed to do it.

Perhaps from hence it will be ſuſpected the writer is an enemy to Mr. —; but he is ſo far from it that he reſpects that great patriot, as every lover of his country ought; and he conſiders him as the fountain of our many and ſurpriſing ſucceſſes in the preſent war; he entirely agrees with the ſentiments of a ſpirited and judicious writer, who thus ſpeaks of that able miniſter, in relating the tranſactions of the year 1758.

" Since

* " Since Mr. — came into the ad-
" miniſtration, a remarkakle ſpirit of
" enterprize and reſolution diffuſed it-
" ſelf among all the military and na-
" val commanders: that indolence, in-
" difference, and caution, which was
" ſo conſpicuous three years before,
" was now entirely baniſhed; and ac-
" tivity, zeal, and fearleſs execution,
" ſeemed to reign in every breaſt: and
" this was wholly effected by the in-
" fluence, ſagacity, and intrepidity of
" the miniſter."

Britain continued in this happy ſitu-
ation, till, in a ſtate of infatuation,
ſhe was tempted to receive the demon
of diſſention that was ſent her by

 France.

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* See Review of the reign of George the Second, in which a new light is thrown on the tranſactions, &c. Page 218.

France. This demon firſt pretended peace and friendſhip, but ſoon after he gave us to underſtand, that he was directed, while he was ſettling the diſputes between France and Great-Britain, to pay ſome attention relative to others between Spain and Great-Britain, of an old ſtanding.

This hint, given by the conſent of the Spaniſh miniſtry, was immediately conſidered as a mark of jealouſy in them to our ſucceſſes. From hence a report was inſtantly raiſed, that Spain had concluded a private treaty with France, engaging to furniſh to the French ſhips of war and money, in order to enable them to beat us.

Now, where this report was raiſed, or whether there be any real foundation for it, is, to this day, equally uncertain. However, the great patriot, who, it muſt be acknowledged, is rather

too ſuſceptible of public report, and too firm in his reliance on its veracity, extemporally urged the neceſſity of ſending a Britiſh ſquadron to Cadiz, with poſitive orders to demand a copy of the treaty; and, in caſe of refuſal, to treat the Spaniards as enemies.

This propoſition was rejected, not becauſe it would have been imprudent, had there really been an eligible reaſon for acquieſcing in it, but becauſe there did not appear any. How like knight-errants ſhould we look, to ſend a fleet on ſuch an errand, and the importance of that errand founded only on ſuch diſputable authority? how ready and eager muſt we ſeem in the eyes of all the world for fighting! in what light muſt our admiral appear, if, when he came to Cadiz, he found no ſuch treaty to exiſt? what reflection would all this have caſt on the precipitation of our councils?

The

The probability of ſuch a treaty's exiſtence, is of the moſt doubtful and far-fetched kind: Spain has no reaſonable grounds of apprehenſion from our increaſed power in America: ſhe knows we do not want her mines; and ſhe might likewiſe know that we have no intereſt to promote by becoming a bad neighbour; both of which are evinced by the preſent circumſtances, and the known good faith of the nation.

But this good faith would ceaſe to have been reſpected, had that fleet been ſent; for not only the Spaniards would have ſeized the firſt moment to put a ſtop to our ſucceſſes, but all the reſt of the maritime powers would have done the ſame, from an apprehenſion that it was dangerous to let us conquer too far.

Such

Such a treaty, at this time, is altogether injurious to the true intereſt of Spain; which, it is believed, the Spaniſh monarch has ſenſe and reſolution enough to purſue. To raiſe France from her preſent low condition would be ſo extremely coſtly to the Spaniards, that they muſt be blind not to perceive the burden heaping on their backs, and mad if they conſented to bear it: the money it would take muſt exhauſt them, unleſs the treaſures of their mines could be regularly conveyed from America to Spain; a communication which we can prevent, and which they are not ignorant of: this conveyance cannot be carried on without hazarding their naval force; and one eſſential blow on the ocean will ſtagger the Spaniſh power.

In conſideration of ſuch aſſiſtance, what ſufficient equivalent has France in her

her power to give? can the reputed ſagacious monarch of Spain think the iſland of Minorca of that ineſtimable value? the true policy of Spain is ſo notorious, as to become proverbial; and as all proverbs are founded in the wiſdom of experience, ſo experience has ſhewn them the ſolid wiſdom of this, "war with all the world, and peace with England."

It is allowed, France has had, ſince the treaty of Utrecht, a cloſe connexion with Spain; but this connexion, when conſidered in a commercial light, is a moſt unnatural one: and it is only in a commercial light that it can affect Great-Britain; for in points of commerce, Spain has been greatly and manifeſtly injured by her national advantages, having been made ſubſervient to the mere family ties, as well as partial ambition, of their ſovereigns: therefore the Spaniards, notwithſtanding they

they are become ſuch paſſive vaſſals, as, in reſpect to their own glory in being obedient ſlaves, are not inſenſible that a friend's alliance is hurtful to them; and alſo that their nation is not fully intereſted in providing dominions for the collateral branches of the royal family: ſo that whatever notions the French may endeavour to inſtil into them, for extending their poſſeſſions at any price, they will never powerfully operate with the whole people, who conſider the French alliance as neither for the national intereſt or honour. Thus the connexion, at no time, can be any other than a miniſterial one, or a royal relationſhip. Beſides, the ſubjects of Spain are of manners ſo different from the French, that they hate them, and ſeldom miſs an opportunity of expreſſing an abhorrence, even equal to that they have of the Moors: ſince nothing is more common than to hear them ſay, in point of religion, that the heretics of oll other countries

are better Chriſtians than the Roman Catholics of France *.

It is now left to the reader to judge, what probability or foundation there is for the actual being of ſuch a treaty; or whether ſuch a treaty would not be made previous to a declaration of war on the part of Spain? ——— If the exiſtence of ſuch a treaty is reaſonably diſputed, becauſe it has not been avowed by any authority, where then is the likelihood of a rupture with Spain for what ſhe has *already done*, when it has not been proved that ſhe has done any thing?

To this latter aſſertion it will be anſwered, a number of inſults: but will they, any of them, or all of them, ſufficiently juſtify the nation for going to war? the

* See Mercator's Letters, Let. V.

the principal of which was the unlawful detention of the Antigallican's prize; and do not both nations think their opinions right in that affair? have we not been told that it was in a great meaſure owing to a proper cognizance not being taken of the matter, and the captain's obſtinacy in not ſailing away after receiving wholſome advice for that purpoſe? far be it from the breaſt of any honeſt Engliſhman to think of palliating ſuch an affair: but ſure if ever it could be thought a ſufficient cauſe for going to war, it muſt rather have been deemed ſo at firſt, when it was recent in our memories, than now, when the diſtance of time makes it of courſe the leſs remembered; an object of leſs concern, becauſe it is now leſs affecting to a whole people, many of the particulars being eraſed from their minds by time.

However, as it was an actual inſult offered to this nation, and a real injury to many Britiſh ſubjects; why did not the great Commoner urge a war with Spain when it happened? or why were not letters of repriſal granted to the owners of the Antigallican? it is not without a precedent. We then acquieſced to the judgment of Spain, and this piece of flagrant injuſtice has been ſuffered to lie in quiet near four years, without being hardly ſo much as mentioned. Why is it brought up at this juncture? have we not war, and ſlaughter, and horror enough, that we are wiſhing for more? or what has Spain done beſides, that ſhould juſt at this time awake in our minds a remembrance of this tranſaction? for the ſatisfaction of the reader we will ſee.

During the late negociation, while M. Buſſy attended in London, Spain wrote

wrote a letter to France, requeſting that M. Buſſy might, in framing the general articles of peace, pay ſome attention to certain matters of mutual complaint between us and the Spaniards, which might poſſibly occaſion ſome future rupture between the two kingdoms, and diſturb the tranquility of Europe.

The channel through which this application was made, has been found fault with, becauſe the Spaniards have an ambaſſador of their own at our court, who might have tranſacted this buſineſs himſelf. But it ſhould be remembered that previous to the negotiation, the interpoſition and mediation of all the neutral powers, under whatſoever plea, was abſolutely rejected. Could the Spaniſh ambaſſador then interpoſe? Would not ſuch interpoſition made by him perſonally, have raiſed a greater flame than is now burning? Was there any other channel for making this application?

cation? or does the application itſelf, when abſtracted from the colourings and hyperbole of ſtate, even inſinuate a thought that tends to break the bonds of friendſhip.

M. Buſſy might exceed his commiſſion, and he might execute it with inſolence; but if ſo, why was not a copy of *the letter itſelf* demanded? according to the anſwer, we might have proceeded with ſome perſpicuity; as it is, we are in the dark. However, to ſhew that no harm was intended by that application, we are told by French authority, and Engliſh authority has not yet contradicted it, that the Spaniſh monarch declared, if the objects which concerned his kingdom, ſhould embarraſs the negociation and retard the peace, he agreed, that thoſe points ſhould be no farther negociated on his part.

What

What ſtronger proof could Spain have given of her amity? why then ſhould we go to war with a friendly nation, who talks in ſo complaiſant a manner? Some merchants and brokers of the city of London will anſwer, becauſe we ſhall be benefitted by it. But they are miſtaken; *we* ſhall not be benefitted by it: a few of *them*, perhaps, may, but the nation in general will loſe by it.

Let any one conſider what effect the cry of a Spaniſh war will have; it will ſpread like a train of gun-powder among the lower ſort of people; the temptation of getting the treaſures of the Spaniſh mines, will, like the ten thouſand pound prize in the lottery, induce infinite numbers of all branches of mechanics to embark themſelves into a ſtate of probability of being entitled to fortune's favour: they will enter on board privateers, and other armed ſhips,

and

and by this the manufactures of the kingdom will receive ſuch an injury, as ten years ſucceſsful war with Spain will not be enough to repair.

Now what will theſe poor people get by it? ſome of them may have the good luck to take a rich prize, and the thoughts of getting thouſands for their ſhare, will make them ſpend more in licentiouſneſs than their ſhare comes to: the ſhip is brought into port, is condemned and ſold; but during this time the ſailors are living upon advance-money, and, perhaps, for ſome years after; then when the accounts come to be ſettled, and the ſhares divided, the common man's, which, in equity ought to have amounted to one hundred pounds, will not exceed ſixty, according to the ordinary methods made uſe of. What then muſt be the condition of thoſe who take nothing? who having expended every halfpenny they had

bad in equipping themſelves for the ſea ſervice, they are become habitual to wickedneſs; and when they return to land, inſtead of being uſeful, as they were formerly, turn out dangerous to ſociety, and ſet the civil power at defiance.

Already the trade of the nation has ſuffered extremely by the want of hands; what then muſt be the caſe when we have another enemy to cope with, by which our warriors muſt of courſe be augmented? are we *all* to quit our families, our ſhops, or our daily labour, and go to fighting for the benefit of a few, and to humour the caprice of others? nothing ſurely at this time could be more impolitic, than entering into a new war with any European power.

The want of men in almoſt all branches of buſineſs, ought to be con-

ſidered as a ſtrong and powerful argument againſt whatever has been urged in favour of a Spaniſh war; and our ſtate politicians ſhould conſider, that to diſtreſs our manufactures more than they have already done, by taking away men, will produce many fatal conſequences: and how are we to exiſt without the manual executors of our trade?

The wives and families of three fourths of thoſe men who will quit their buſineſs and run away to fight the Spaniards, will fall heavy burthens upon the divers pariſhes to which they belong; and are our taxes ſo few, and ſo gentle, that we are unmindful of the neceſſity there then would be of our poors rates being raiſed? theſe poor, deſerted, and helpleſs wretches, muſt be thus maintained, or periſh; and can we ſee the latter? will our humanity bear it? certainly not: they will have

no other recourſe for their ſubſiſtance. Who is it but knows this, and who is it that does not feel at the thoughts of it?

But to this ſucceeds another evil. Our lower ſort of people are too apt to live in a ſtate of diſſoluteneſs, occaſioned by their brutiſh tutelage and want of the firſt principles of manners and education; a ſtate into which theſe fatherleſs children, by the ſame cauſe, inevitably fall; and fifty years hence, what will our lower ſort of people in a great meaſure conſiſt of? thieves, aſſaſſins, and incendiaries. Do we not ſee the evil every day growing upon us? and to what is it owing but to the want of parents to properly educate their children, or to brutiſh parents who never had any education at all.

What a train of evils are here! excluſive of the article of depopulation,

which muſt be the neceſſary conſequence by the deſtruction of men; an article, which every conſiderate and trading man cannot reflect on without pain; an article, of ſo much importance to the nation and the ſtate, that it is a very doubtful point, whether the greateſt advantages our fondeſt hopes can preſage in a Spaniſh war, will make an equivalent for it alone.

By the report of the pariſh clerks within the bills of mortality, for the laſt year only, it appeared, there had been buried 4398 ſouls more than had been chriſtened. This is a recent and alarming inſtance of depopulation. Ought we not rather, inſtead of augmenting this evil, by promoting ſlaughter, ſeek out for means to prevent it? and where ſhall we find this ſalutary means but in the boſom of peace? or where the promotion of it, but in the increaſe of war?

'It is the multitude of ſubjects, and 'not the extent of territory, that makes 'a kingdom great and formidable; for 'one well peopled may be vaſtly more 'powerful, than another upon a much 'larger ſpace of country. Therefore it 'ſeems to be one of the firſt principles 'of government, to prevent any dimi-'nution of people, and rather by all 'reaſonable methods to increaſe them, 'which ought particularly to be at-'tended to, when a nation has power-'ful and ambitious neighbours, con-'ſtantly watching an opportunity to 'ſubdue it; for if its numbers be great 'and increaſing, there will be leſs pro-'bability of its ever being vanquiſhed.'

'In the Philoſophical Tranſactions, 'vol. 49, art. 45, and 113, it has been 'ſhewn, that our number in Eng-'land does not exceed five millions 'and an half, and that both in Britain 'and Ireland, the whole is not 'above eight millions and an half,

'or

'or at moſt not nine, though the 'country could maintain the double of 'that number by its natural produce, 'if it was duly cultivated. From 'thence it has been computed, that the 'annual increment of the fencible men 'in both iſlands is leſs than 9000, from 'which all our annual loſſes by land 'and ſea are to be deducted, and thoſe 'by a moderate eſtimate are ſhewn to 'be rather more than that number; 'conſequently, by that calculation it 'appears, that there is no increaſe of 'our fencible men for the laſt ſixty years, 'and therefore no increaſe of our 'people *."

There is a fatality among us that rages like an epidemic diſtemper; a childiſh paſſion for novelty: our original American war was transferred into Germany, and we were fond of the tranſition; now we are tired of it, and want

* Vid. Eſſay on Ways and Means for the Supplies of Government.

want to go to war with the Spaniards. How like a fooliſh tradeſman is this, who having had ſucceſs in one branch of buſineſs, neglects to vigouroufly purſue it by precipitately entering into a multitude of others, till at length he is ruined. Of all nations in the world, the Engliſh is moſt remarkable for its fickleneſs and inclination to change; we are always in a flux of opinions, and never continue fixed in any long together, which is the reaſon that we have undergone ſo many viciſſitudes in our political affairs.

The accumulating load of national debt under which we labour, is not conſidered as any thing; it is almoſt forgot; but in fact it is a very material conſideration, and will be found ſo at one time or other: we cannot go to war with Spain, without ſinking ourſelves fifty millions more in debt; and is that nothing? ſuppoſe the money

can

can be raiſed with facility, how is the intereſt to be paid? the difficulties that will be met with at this time, in finding out ways and means, are ſtrong prognoſtics of what the caſe muſt be when we have Spain as well as France to cope with: the ſupplies in ſuch a caſe, will amount to at leaſt thirty millions annually, and what new taxes muſt be laid to pay the intereſt of this amazing ſum? does not every man, from the cottager to the peer, groan under the preſſure of the preſent taxes? then what muſt our condition be, if the ſupplies ſhould ever become nine or ten millions more?

"He that has land feels the weight "of the war, and muſt either reduce "his hoſpitality or run out his eſtate. "He that has no land, but lives by his "labour, will meet with its effects in "meat, drink, waſhing, and lodging, "none of which he can be without;

"and

" and all of which have grown dearer
" ſince this war began. If he is con-
" tent to go without ſtrong beer, the
" malt tax will make him feel it in
" ſmall. The monied man may ſee
" little reaſon to complain, but he may
" ſee it if he opens his eyes; let him
" conſider what an addition it has made
" to our public debt; and let him re-
" flect, that when that load becomes
" inſupportable, a remedy muſt be
" found. Theſe are truths univerſally
" known, becauſe they are univerſally
" felt; and all the power of fine
" language cannot perſuade us out of
" them. Poverty cannot be made eaſy
" by flowing periods, or the ſenſe of
" miſery removed by the boldeſt flights
" of rhetoric."

Thoſe who urge the neceſſity of a Spaniſh war, do not think about what it will coſt; they do not conſider the neceſſity there will be for raiſing more

money, and they know nothing of the difficulty that will be found in ſo doing. In a little time the burden will ſit heavy on their ſhoulders, and then they will clamour at the expence.

There are few intelligent men but what know, that Britiſh ſubjects have within this little while offered ſeveral inſults to the Spaniards: would not then the expoſing ſuch conduct of ſome of our merchants and their commanders, raiſe a great clamour in the nation? And would not the people divide in their belief and diſbelief of ſuch Spaniſh repreſentations? It certainly is better to diſſolve than foment parties; and is it not better to conſider theſe mutual and petty grievancies as trifling tranſactions of courſe, and perhaps unavoidable, conſidering the humour and paſſion of individuals, when two neighbouring nations are at war with each other, than enter into another war

on

on ſuch minute puntilios or immaterial account?

Were our circumſtances different, and had we a greater plenty of men and money, we might ſhew ourſelves eager in juſtification; but as it is, we ſhould certainly take a more wiſe, and a more prudent ſtep, in oppoſing ſuch a proceeding, than involving us and our poſterity in evils, which no man can ſee the end of.

But thoſe who believe the honour of a nation is to be conſidered like that of a proud and choleric man, who is ſoon affronted, and as ſoon draws his ſword, are very weak; and yet there are many who do: can they think to be fed with points of honour? An ingenious gentleman ſays, it is more prudent and profitable, and therefore more honourable, in a nation, ſometimes to put up a ſmall injury, than to riſk a greater to repair it.

Who has not heard of Alcibiades plunging his country into a runious war; of his advice to Pericles to do the ſame; and of Cardinal Richlieu, engaging France in a war with Spain, without any reaſonable and natural provocation, or gaining any ſolid advantage by it? Let not an extravagant notion of honour ſtimulate us to become the Quixotes of the world; nor ſtir us up to fight to negociate, and negociate, to fight again, as long as we are a ſtate.

The advocates for a Spaniſh war, acknowledge that a German one at the ſame time will be too expenſive; then, ſince we cannot relinquiſh the latter, we muſt forbear entering into the former, unleſs in compliance with our Germanic ſyſtem, we can bring the Spaniards into Germany by way of diverſion. But ſurely we have felt enough of ſuch like diverſions to wiſh for any more of them.

When the ſword is drawn, beſides thoſe who immediatetly engage, others, from various views and inſtigations, are often drawn in; and what was at firſt a conteſt between two, comes at laſt to involve twenty. Thus wars commenced in a heat have laſted many years with inceſſant rage, to the ruin of whole communities. Let us not be ſo raſh, to commence another war in a heat, that may intail ſuch miſeries. It may ſeem apparent to ſome men, that there is a greater probability of the war's being extended than diminiſhed; yet whether we ſhould be in haſte to extend it, is a matter worthy of the moſt ſerious conſideration.

We have been told, that when Mr. --- reſigned, a great perſonage ſaid, with regard to the propoſed meaſure of a Spaniſh

Spaniſh war ‡, " that he would cer-
" tainly have found himſelf under the
" greateſt difficulty how to have acted,
" even though the whole —— had con-
" curred in ſupporting it". Hence it is plain, the inconveniences and evils attending a Spaniſh war, at this critical juncture, were foreſeen.

Thoſe who would be thought the moſt ſagacious advocates for a Spaniſh war, poſitively ſay that it will *pay* itſelf, and, of courſe, put us to no additional expence. Upon this deluſive and falſe reaſoning they reſt all their rhetoric, to explain away the miſchiefs attending ſuch a meaſure.

However, among all that has been ſaid on this favourite and popular part of

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‡ See a Letter to a Right Honourable Perſon Verſified.

part of the topic, there does not appear the leaſt ſubſtance of truth. The riches to be acquired by taking Spaniſh prizes are magnified to impoſſibilities; but, admitting they were ſuch as are repreſented, they are only ſuch as are fit for repaying individuals for their expences in equipping, not thoſe much greater ones of the ſtate.

When a large fleet is fitted out at the expence of a whole nation, it ſhould have ſomething elſe for its object of enterprize, than exhauſting its ſtores, and expoſing itſelf to deſtruction in hurricanes and high ſeas, in queſt of Spaniſh trading veſſels: and what has Spain ſo *extremely* valuable, that will indemnify our heavy charges in a ſhort time? We have more iſlands than we are able to keep, or at leaſt more than our great miniſter thought it politic to keep, and more territory than we can people. What then are we to fight the Spaniards for?

for? for taking a few ſhips, which will turn out beneficial only to a few merchants and brokers, and throw away the lives of the national forces, and laviſh away the national treaſures in making conqueſts which we muſt return, becauſe they are more than we can keep.

But ſuppoſing the conqueſts and captures we made, were really profitable to the ſtate and the people, let us ſee what injury Spain would be able to do us on her part.

In the firſt place, our large trade to that kingdom would entirely ceaſe: therefore, of courſe, as the balance is greatly in our favour, we ſhould, in that caſe, be a conſiderable loſer: our advantageous Leghorn and Levant trade would, by the union of the French and Spaniſh fleets, cruizers, and privateers, in the Mediterranean, become very hazardous and precarious, and its ſafety,

except

except with a better convoy than it is ſuppoſed can be allowed, at no time to be depended upon.

As we have loſt Minorca, the effects of the Spaniſh power will be ſtronger felt than heretofore; we ſhall find to our coſt, that Gibraltar is a too diſtant place for our ſhips to take refuge in on moſt occaſions: our trade from the Weſt Indies, and other parts of America, will be not leſs liable to ſuffer, becauſe in their return they commonly make one of the points of the Spaniſh continent, as the firſt parts of Europe; therefore of courſe will fall into the way of the Spaniſh armed ſhips, which accounts for ſo many of our trading veſſels being carried into Spaniſh ports during the laſt war.

Portugal being now in a leſs formidable ſtate than before, having received ſuch deplorable wounds in her internal

exiſtence, muſt ſubmit to the awe and dictates of Spain, becauſe ſhe is not in a condition to refuſe peremptory demands from ſuch a neighbour, when there is no barrier for her ſecurity. Where then can Portugal, too weak to defend herſelf, look for an able and truſty ally, ſuppoſing ſhe would willingly repel the power of Spain? to Italy? no; they have no ſuccours to ſend; but, on the contrary, live themſelves in perpetual need of them from others. Can Holland do the buſineſs? moſt certainly no; her ſtrength and weight are inſufficient. And as for the more northern kingdoms, they are at too great a diſtance, and too poor, to enter upon, or comply with ſuch an engagement. Great Britain then is the only nation that has been, or would be, the ſafe, the truſty, the generous, and the able ſupporter of Portugal: but the preſent ſituation of affairs will not admit of Great Britain's giving any ſuch aſſiſtance.

Great

Great Britain is tied down to Germany, and that war muſt be vigorouſly purſued; therefore ſhe alone cannot uphold Pruſſia, Hanover, Heſſe, and Portugal, againſt a confederacy of the moſt powerful potentates in Chriſtendom. Hence it is evident that Portugal muſt of neceſſity ſubmit to the dictates of Spain; therefore from that inſtant that a rupture breaks out between Great Britain and Spain, our trade with Portugal ceaſes; and, what is of more importance than all the reſt, the importation of the vaſt ſums in the Portugal coin, which is become ſo current amongſt us, and without which we ſhould find it a very difficult matter to carry on our inland trade, muſt ceaſe likewiſe.

How can it be aſſerted, and ſupported, that a Spaniſh war will pay itſelf on the part of ourſelves, when there are all theſe diſadvantages againſt us? will not every conſiderate man, who ma-

turely weighs theſe arguments, think it ought to be our ſincere and conſtant ſtudy to avoid entering into a war with Spain? and though ſhe may look on the increaſe of our conqueſts with a jealous eye, yet we ſhould not go ſo far as to arrogantly affront her; nor to wantonly give her provocation, becauſe ſhe does not like we ſhould humble France. The ſame may be ſaid of Denmark; he does not like the Ruſſians and Auſtrians ſhould cruſh Pruſſia; yet he will not interpoſe till the caſe becomes deſperate.

There is not the leaſt doubt but that Spain will diſapprove of our taking Martinico; but is it not time enough to go to war with Spain when we find ſhe is actually determined to be no longer at peace? As hitherto no ſuch ſentiments have appeared, why ſhould we firſt enter the liſts, in order to bring on expences and bloody diſputes?

Rather

Rather let us, at all events, ſteadily and vigorouſly proſecute our national war againſt France; let us get Martinico and Louiſiana in our hands, and we need not then be afraid of what Spain can do to us; our arms will then be at leiſure, and may be employed without any additional expence; but we may depend upon it ſhe will, in ſuch a caſe, be very cautious of doing hurt to herſelf. Admitting that Spain is, in ſecret, a friend to France, yet would any man be ſo precipitate in his politics, as to think it never prudent in a nation to wink at ſmall injuries, but always hazard great inconveniencies, by an untimely reſentment of them? As was obſerved before, let our ſtateſmen firſt more effectually reduce the French, before they precipitate themſelves into a war with Spain.

We

We muſt have preparations to make for a new war as well as Spain, and are coolly to conſider to what extents it may involve us, who have already too many other powers, that we too extenſively ſupport, and in granting of whom great ſuccours, we are already prejudicing our own cauſe. Were we unincumbered by Germany, we might fear no war with any maritime ſtate in Europe, but do as Cromwell did on our own element, that is, *drub them all round.*

But let thoſe anſwer for their own politics, who engaged us in ſo many expenſive treaties on the continent, and ſome of them INDEMNIFYING us the conſequences, of which there is yet no pretending to foreſee. Theſe are the ſhackles that reſtrain us in our motions, and which ought to make us cautious of taking raſh ſteps.

There

There are ſeveral ſenſible writers, who have been bold enough, and honeſt enough, to give their ſentiments of diſapprobation on our connexions with Germany, particularly the writer of the Review of the Reign of George II. who, relating the tranſactions of the year 1743, imputes the cauſe of the rebellion to the German war of that time. The prevailing diſcontent among the people on account of it, inſtilled a hope into the pretender, that they were ripe for revolt. 'Many of them, ſays he, 'found it an uncomfortable theme to 'reflect on the numerous and heavy 'taxes, the increaſed annual expences, 'and the growing debts, under which 'they laboured; likewiſe their poverty, 'and ruin of their commerce; all which 'they could not but think were brought 'on by embarking this nation into a 'German war, merely for the defence 'of Hanover, without any poſſibility of pro-

'producing the leaſt advantage to Great
'Britain; who, thus yoked to the
'continent, and to continental wars,
'muſt ſupply them with men and mo-
'ney, not only at the hazard of her in-
'ternal ſafety, but of the whole of her
'wealth; while many of her head men,
'who ought to be, as they were of old,
'the ſupporters of her bulwarks, pro-
'perties, laws and liberties, were half
'Germanized; and being of courſe ſe-
'parated, from an honeſt and ſtrict conſi-
'deration of her true intereſt, were pur-
'ſuing a coſtly and bloody phantom of
'whim, caprice, and parade. How
'unlike are theſe to thoſe glorious days
'of diminutive expence? before this
'nation was chained down to the rock
'of adverſity; before its brave troops
'were compelled to wade into inhoſ-
'pitable regions, and combat with foes,
'whoſe names, till within this century,
'we never heard of?'

With

With the ſame ſpirit this writer again ſpeaks of theſe deſtructive wars in page 256, Anno 1760. " Deſtructive " we call it, becauſe never ſince the " days of ignorance and barbariſm, have " men been ſlaughtered with ſuch " wantonneſs and profuſion, been ex- " poſed to the unparallelled miſeries of " winter campaigns, to diſtempers, to " the rigour of the ſeaſon, to periſhing " by want of food, to inſupportable " fatigues, and other innumerable hard- " ſhips, all impoſed in contempt of " humanity, and in deſpite of nature. " Such is German diſcipline! and ſuch " the feeling of German generals! who, " without the leaſt conſideration of the " lives of men, prodigally ſacrifice " them upon many an uſeleſs and mad " exploit. Britain has ſeverely felt " theſe woes; the flower of her arms " have been ſlaughtered, or carried off " by diſeaſe and hardſhips, in thoſe " inhoſpitable regions; her inhabitants

" have been ſaddled with the moſt
" grievous impoſitions to ſupport un-
" grateful allies, from whom ſhe could
" receive no benefit, and by whom, as
" a reward for ſo liberally pouring out
" her many good things, ſhe was at
" length deſerted; then by ſupporting
" another in a quarrel purely his own,
" from which ſhe can derive no benefit,
" and with which ſhe has not the leaſt
" connexion; whoſe private and public
" character concur in teſtifying he is of
" the blackeſt die: whoſe faith has
" been ſo often forfeited, and is held
" in ſuch diſtruſtful repute, that no-
" thing will be hazarded in ſaying, he
" will no longer be an ally than while
" he is paid for it. Thus, by the ex-
" portation of her treaſure and men,
" ſhe is bleeding to death; ſhe is ſtill
" chained down, Prometheus like, to
" the rock of Germany, for its vultures
" and eagles to drain her blood, and
" prey on her heart."

Theſe

Theſe German wars have been the cauſe of all our other wars becoming but ſecondary conſiderations, even the articles in all our late treaties of pacification, have been totally or nearly ſacrificed to German intereſts; and that is the cauſe why we never have had a permanent peace. The Germans are alway at war; it is their trade; and if we are alway ſome how or other connected, we ſhall alway be at war too. Any man who remembers the tranſactions of only theſe laſt forty years, knows this to be the caſe.

There could appear no policy in urging an attack on Spain, juſt after her late flota arrived; as there were no hopes of making it advantageous for time, (a kind of credit which Great-Britain cannot afford to give) becauſe there is a neceſſity which every one may

perceive, for the returns being as quick as poſſible.

Our ſituation is critical, and every man of ſenſe will acknowledge it. The annual ſupplies will, in all probability, exceed twenty millions, the difficulties of raiſing which, without ſorely aggrieving the ſubject, are manifeſt: every one allows the weight lies heavy upon our ſhoulders; how then are we to ſuſtain an additional load, with, at leaſt, no likelihood of its being lightened for a conſiderable while, and at the ſame time labouring under the multitude of diſadvantages already exhibited?

The Spaniſh flota being arrived, and its treaſures ſafely lodged in places of ſecurity; how are we to make a Spaniſh war pay itſelf ſo ſoon as our circumſtances require? there has not appeared any thing which can be deemed an anſwer to this queſtion.

If

If we are ſo fortunate to take Martinico and Louiſiana, the plantation and provincial power of France will be ſubdued, and it is probable that we may with advantage humble Spain likewiſe; for by the time theſe conqueſts are atchieved, there will be another flota perhaps ready to ſail; then if Spain gives us proof that ſhe will be our foe, the giving her the firſt blow at ſuch a juncture may diſconcert all her meaſures. It is true this is reaſoning in the dark; on diſtant probabilities, without a full knowledge of facts; becauſe there is no knowing how or in what manner circumſtances then may be.

At preſent it is unanſwerable that a Spaniſh war is impolitic, becauſe we cannot immediately bear ſuch an additional expence, except we have a quick indemnification, and that cannot be had, becauſe it will be ſome time before

fore the next flota will be ready to fall in our way; neither, on the contrary, does it appear that Spain is ſo over eager to embark in the war, as ſome people imagine; that ſhe may have a ſort of an itching few amongſt us will be inclined to diſpute; but as long as ſhe does not act, ought we to go to war with her for thinking?

The Writer hopes he may be allowed permiſſion to conclude this admonition to his countrymen, with ſome account of that extraordinary great man, Villars, *the firſt duke of* Buckingham, *that abſolute miniſter and favorite of king James and king Charles I. who was ſuch an amazing comet of fame and power, as hath not been ſince ſeen in our hemiſphere, and it is to be hoped will never be ſeen again.*

HIS birth and extraction were rather obſcure than illuſtrious *, being only the younger ſon of a private country gentleman; but being endowed, by nature, with a very graceful perſon, and brought up, by the ſingular fondneſs of his mother, in a manner which naturally led him to court, he ſoon drew upon himſelf the eyes of a Prince, who, of all wiſe men living, it ſeems, was the moſt delighted

* Vid. Craftſman, No. 44, An. 1727.

lighted and taken with handſome perſons, and with fine cloaths.

He had not been many days there, before he was made Cup-bearer to King James I. which was the firſt poſt he enjoyed, and the firſt lucky ſtep to all his future grandeur.

'He acted very few weeks (as my 'Lord Clarendon informs us) upon this 'ſtage, when he mounted higher. He 'was made a Baron, a Viſcount, an Earl, 'a Marquis, and became Lord High 'Admiral of England, Lord Warden of 'the Cinque-Ports, Maſter of the 'Horſe, and entirely diſpoſed of all the 'graces of the King, in conferring all 'the honours and all the offices of three 'kingdoms without a rival; in diſ-'penſing whereof, he was guided more 'by the rules of appetite, than of judg-'ment, and ſo exalted almoſt all of his 'own numerous family and depend-

ants;

'ants; whoſe greateſt merit was their 'alliance to him; which offended the 'antient nobility, who ſaw the ex-'pences of the court ſo vaſt and unli-'mited, that they had a ſad proſpect of 'that poverty and neceſſity, which 'afterwards befel the crown, almoſt to 'the ruin of it.'

Being thus advanced to the higheſt pinacle of fortune, and conſequently ſurrounded with a croud of abject flatterers and ſycophants, ſome of whom called him our Saviour, he began to ſhew himſelf in his proper colours.

He was a man of ſuch immoderate and inſolent ambition, that not content with all the power he enjoyed, and all the favours which were heaped in ſo extravagant a manner, on himſelf, his relations, and dependants, he could not bear to ſee any of his fellow-ſubjects (though of the beſt families, the greateſt

abilities, or the moſt unblemiſhed fidelity in the kingdom) to partake with him in the King's favour in any degree, or to diſtinguiſh themſelves in any affair of truſt, honour, or profit. This inſatiable, engroſſing ſpirit, and impatience to ſee any man gain reputation beſides himſelf, rendered him jealous of the Earl of Briſtol, who was, at that time, ambaſſador extraordinary at the court of Spain, and had in a manner concluded the treaty of marriage with the Infanta, for which he was ſent thither; for as the King's heart was very much ſet on this match, and Buckingham apprehended that the ſucceſsful management of it would redound too much to the honour of that ambaſſador, he reſolved to diſappoint him by carrying the Prince in perſon into Spain, which he found it no hard matter to perſuade him to, being naturally fond of adventures; though there was ſome difficulty in obtaining the

King's

King's conſent; but he had now got ſuch an abſolute aſcendency over him, that he ſoon removed all objections, and though he ſet out *incog.* yet he appeared there with a ſplendid retinue, and put the nation to a vaſt expence.

As the ſole motive to this mad, unadviſed journey (for which any man ought to have loſt his head) was private envy to the earl of Briſtol, ſo Buckingham was no ſooner arrived there with the prince, than the ſame inſolent ſpirit and exorbitant ambition engaged him in a perſonal quarrel not only with the ambaſſador, but alſo with the duke of Olivarez, the prime miniſter of Spain, which he was reſolved to revenge on both of them, by returning into England, and breaking off the match.

Accordingly, he came back with the prince, not without great difficulty and hazard; and having got a parliament

call'd, engaged them, by falſe repreſentations and other unwarrantable influences, to diſſuade the king from continuing the treaty of marriage, and immediately to declare war againſt Spain.

My lord Clarendon tells us that, "He engaged his old unwilling maſter "and the kingdom in this war (not to "mention the bold journey to Spain "or the breach of that match) in a "time, when the crown was poor, and "the people more inclin'd to a bold "enquiry how it came to be ſo, than "dutiful to provide for its ſupply; and "this only upon perſonal animoſities "between him and the duke of Oli-"varez, the ſole favourite of that "court; and thoſe animoſities from "very trivial provocations."

At the ſame time, Cranfield, earl of Middleſex, lord high treaſurer of England

land (who was one of Buckingham's creatures, and nearly allyed to him by marriage) fell under his grace's diſpleaſure, for having neglected to ſupply him with ſufficient ſums of money during his abſence in Spain, and even preſuming to diſpute his commands and appeal to the king, whoſe ear he had now gained, and thought himſelf ſo firmly eſtabliſhed in his good opinion, that he ſhould not any longer ſtand in need of the favourite's ſupport. But the duke, upon his return, being apprized of this, and finding the parliament diſpoſed to his mind, was reſolved to cruſh this bold rival, and thereby deter others from preſuming to interfere with him in his majeſty's eſteem.

At length the king became weary of this inſolent favorite, and was reſolved either to diſmiſs him totally from his ſervice, or to retrench his unlimited power;

power; at leaſt this opinion prevailed ſo much, that it induced ſeveral great men, in both houſes, to withdraw their former abſolute dependance on him.

But the king's ſudden death (which, it was thought, happened very opportunely for him) and prince Charles's ſucceſſion to the throne, procured him, as it were, a new leaſe of power, and reinſtated him in his former grandeur. For though the prince could not have entirely forgot his former inſolence and perſonal indignities to him, yet the duke, by his journey into Spain, which was very grateful to the prince, and his great power in his father's court, had found many opportunities of extenuating or excuſing that part of his conduct; which he did ſo effectually, "that he continued in the ſame degree of favour at the leaſt with the ſon, which he enjoyed under the father".

But

But though he had thus firmly re-eſtabliſhed himſelf in his maſter's favour and confidence, yet he did not long retain his credit with the parliament; for the ſame over-bearing, impetuous temper which had hurried him, in the former reign, into a war with Spain, made him, in this, run as violently into a war with France, without any other provocation than a diſappointment in an amour; which involved him in ſeveral fatal difficulties, from which he could never extricate himſelf.

This great man, as my lord Clarendon aſſures us, "Had, by long prac-"tice, obtained a quick conception and "apprehenſion of buſineſs, and had "the habit of ſpeaking very gracefully "and pertinently. ——— Nay we are "further told, that it was never known "that the temptation of money ſwayed "him to do an unjuſt or unkind thing;" which ſeems ſomething extraordinary in a man of his character.

FINIS.

FINIS.